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NOTES
A MODERN APPROACH To THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE
RECONCILIATION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITH GOVERNMENTAL
INTERESTS
An employer sought injunctive relief against a warrantless
inspection authorized by the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA). A three-judge district court held that the fourth
amendment requires a warrant for the type of search permitted
by the statute and that the statutory authorization for warrant-
less inspections is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court af-
firmed and held that the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it
purports to authorize inspections without a warrant or its
equivalent and that the employer was entitled to an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of that portion of the Act. Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
According to the language of the fourth amendment, the
people are protected from "unreasonable" searches and sei-
zures, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.'
The original meaning of this language is evidenced by an ex-
planation of the historical setting surrounding the amend-
ment's passage. In England, general warrants had been issued
authorizing the search and seizure of books and papers contain-
ing seditious libel.' Although such general warrants were de-
clared illegal in England in 1765,1 the colonial counterpart, the
writs of assistance, continued to be issued, empowering cus-
toms officials to search at their will.4 General resentment to-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
2. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSITUTrIoN 42 (1937). The author provides an extensive historical
account of the developments surrounding the fourth amendment.
3. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). This case involved an
action in trespass for breaking and entering plaintiff's house under the authority of a
general warrant specific as to the person but general as to the papers to be seized.
4. N. LAssoN, supra note 2, at 53-54, 68-78.
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ward the writs of assistance, coupled with the recognized ille-
gality of general warrants in England, provided the necessary
stimulus for revolution.'
After independence was achieved, the colonial struggle
over the writs of assistance was reflected in the guarantees of
the fourth amendment.'As originally drafted, the amendment
constituted only a prohibition against general warrants, the use
of which was characterized as an unreasonable search and sei-
zure.7 Although the final draft contained a general prohibition
against reasonable searches and seizures, the warrant clause
remained substantially independent, indicating that the prohi-
bition against general warrants remained an essential objective
of the amendment.' Both the historical background and the
phrasing of the amendment, then, support the conclusion that
the original concern was with general warrants rather than war-
rantless searches.9
During the century following the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court had little opportunity to apply and
develop the fourth amendment. 0 In 1886 the opportunity to do
so was presented in the case of Boyd v. United States." The
5. Id. at 51.
6. E. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5, at 6-7 (1970). The author states that "when
our forefathers set about the business of founding these United States, it was their
recent experiences with general warrants and writs of assistance that impelled them
to insist upon providing, in the basic charters of state and nation, suitable guarantees
against unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at § 4, at 6.
7. The fourth amendment as originally proposed by James Madison stated:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons; their houses, their papers,
and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the
persons or things to be seized.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
8. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42-43 (1969).
9. Id. at 41. For a discussion of the reasoning behind the present phraseology,
see N. LASSON, supra note 2, at 103. The author concludes that the general principle
of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure was stated by way of premise whereas
the positive prohibition was directed toward warrants issued without probable cause.
10. T. TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 44.
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). This case involved an act of Congress which authorized
a court of the United States, in customs revenue cases and on motion of the govern-
ment attorney, to require the defendant to produce in court his private books, invoices
and papers, or the allegations of the attorney were to be taken as confessed. The Court
held the statute unconstitutional as repugnant to the fourth and fifth amendments.
Significantly, the Court referred to the Entick decision, see note 3, supra, as the
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Boyd opinion was a reaction to general warrants in the new
form of a provision requiring the compulsory production of pri-
vate books, invoices, and papers. 2 The Court admitted that
certain governmental intrusions did not fall within the prohibi-
tions of the fourth amendment." The search for and seizure of
a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining
information or using them as evidence against him, however,
could not be sanctioned as within the category of allowable
governmental intrusions.'4 Thus, the Court emphasized the
individual's right to privacy in spite of the governmental con-
cern with enforcing customs revenue laws, in declaring the law
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court decisions since Boyd which have ap-
plied the fourth amendment reveal the unending struggle be-
tween individual privacy interests and governmental needs.,5
The development of fourth amendment theory and doctrine
portrays the problems inherent in any attempt to reconcile
legitimate governmental interests with individual rights to pri-
vacy, problems which are receiving increased attention in the
area of administrative inspections. The tension between grow-
ing administrative powers of investigation and constitutional
principles concerning privacy," led to a challenge to the consti-
applicable authority in its condemnation of the invasion of "the indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property." Id. at 630. Both opinions
expressed a concern for the right to privacy, a guarantee which the Boyd court found
in the fourth amendment.
12. Id. at 620. See Miles, Decline of the Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule
Mapp v. Ohio?, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 9, 33-34 (1977). The author emphasizes that the
Boyd court viewed the fourth amendment as a bulwark against governmental invasion
of privacy, which was to be broadly interpreted to prevent intrusive governmental
practices which were never contemplated by its drafters.
13. 116 U.S. at 623-24.
14. Id. The Court distinguished the search in Boyd from a search for stolen goods
or goods subject to duties. In the latter case the government is entitled to the possession
of the property and in the former it is not. Also, the second type of search and seizure
was authorized by common law and English statutes for two centuries and by the
government of the United States from its beginning. Id. at 623.
15. Miles, supra note 12, at 73. The author analyzes the Court's fourth amend-
ment decisions on a continuum ranging from periods of restrictive interpretation of the
amendment, which give greater weight to asserted governmental interests, to periods
of broad interpretation, whenever confronted with a new or increasingly aggressive
form of intrusive law enforcement activity.
16. For an excellent survey and history of the early development of administra-
tive investigation, see Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALE L.J.
1111 (1947).
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tutionality of warrantless administrative inspections in
District of Columbia v. Little." The court of appeals, empha-
sizing the right of a man to privacy in his home, declared that
a government official could not invade a private home unless
authorized by a magistrate or impelled by an immediate major
crisis."8 The Supreme Court affirmed the result, but in so doing
avoided the fourth amendment issue."9 Ten years later, how-
ever, the Supreme Court held in Frank v. Maryland' that a
search warrant was not required in a health inspection of a
private dwelling.21 The Court stressed the need for general wel-
fare ordinances to maintain minimal standards of housing and
to prevent the spread of disease; furthermore, the Court noted
that these statutes could be effectively enforced only through
a power to inspect unhampered by the blanket application of
the safeguards necessary in the criminal law such as the war-
rant and probable cause requirements.2
With the decision of Camara v. Municipal Court,13 Frank
was overruled to the extent that it sanctioned warrantless
inspections. Rather, the Court held that area inspections are
17. 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 399 U.S. 1 (1950).
Appellee refused to unlock the front door of her home at the command of a health
department inspector who was without a warrant, resulting in a criminal conviction
which the court of appeals reversed.
18. 178 F.2d at 17.
19. 399 U.S. 1 (1950). The Court stated:
[A] decision of the constitutional requirement for a search in this particular
case might have far-reaching and unexpected implications as to closely related
questions not now before us. This is therefore an appropriate case in which to
apply our sound general policy against deciding constitutional questions if the
record permits final disposition of a cause on non-constitutional grounds.
Id. at 3-4. Here, the Court determined that the respondent's statements were not an
"interference" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 6-7.
20. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
21. In Frank, a resident's refusal to allow a warrantless inspection of the base-
ment of his home resulted in an arrest and conviction that was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court.
22. 359 U.S. at 371-72. Accord, Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (per curiam),
where a similar conviction was affirmed by a four to four decision, with one justice not
present. Justice Brennan's opinion, contrary to the per curiam decision and without
force as precedent, was a significant departure from the Frank decision. Although
recognizing the public interest in the cleanliness and adequacy of dwellings, Justice
Brennan interpreted the fourth amendment as requiring a warrant procedure for health
inspections of the home. Id. at 272-73.
23. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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reasonable and that a warrant could be obtained.24 The Court
agreed that the situation in Frank, a routine inspection of the
physical condition of private property, was a less hostile intru-
sion than the typical crime-related search by a policeman."2
However, the Court refused to characterize the fourth amend-
ment interest at stake in such inspections as "peripheral."2
The Court premised its analysis upon the governing principle
that a search of private property without proper consent is
"unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant.27 Additionally noted was the fourth amendment's re-
quirement that warrants be based upon probable cause, the
standard by which a particular decision to search is tested
against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness.2" In
applying this standard, the governmental interest in prevent-
ing even the unintentional development of conditions hazard-
ous to the public must be balanced against the individual in-
terest in privacy.29 As the Court stated, "In determining
whether a particular inspection is reasonable-and thus in de-
termining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant
for the inspection-the need for the inspection must be
weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforce-
ment."30 The reasonableness of an area code enforcement
inspection is supported by such factors as: 1) a long history of
judicial and public acceptance, 2) the public need, and 3) the
impersonal nature of the inspection.3 ' If the inspection is rea-
sonable, then there exists the probable cause which is required
24. Id. at 537-38.
25. Id. at 530. In Camara, the appellant had refused to permit a warrantless
inspection of his residence, resulting in a criminal charge for violating the San Fran-
cisco Housing Code.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 528-29.
28. Id. at 534.
29. Id. at 534-37.
30. Id. at 535.
31. Id. at 537. The Court also stated:
it is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if
reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area
inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards,
which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon
the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment
house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend
upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.
Id. at 538.
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under the fourth amendment. 2 Similarly, in the companion
case of See v. City of Seattle,3" the Supreme Court held that
Camara applied to health inspections of commercial struc-
tures, although noting that business premises may be reason-
ably inspected in more situations than private homes and thus
that probable cause may be more easily found.34
In spite of the Supreme Court's seemingly strong tendency
to apply the fourth amendment governing principle that war-
rantless searches are unreasonable, there are carefully defined
exceptions to the warrant requirement in the area of adminis-
trative searches. 5 In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States," the Court held that Congress has broad authority to
fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures
of industry long subject to close supervision and inspection-in
that case the liquor industry. 7 Thus the Court recognized the
possibility of a warrantless inspection procedure that does not
violate the fourth amendment.3 8 In United States v. Biswell,
32. The Camara court supplied two standards of reasonableness. First, a warrant
is required in order that a search be reasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. at
528-29. Secondly, the inspection must be reasonable, as determined by the above-
mentioned factors, in order that it may serve as the probable cause prerequisite; it will
be reasonable if there are reasonable legislative or administrative standards for con-
ducting the area inspection. Id. at 538.
33. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
34. Id. at 545-46. See Schwartz, Crucial Areas in Administrative Law, 34 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 401, 425 (1966), where the author notes the significant differences
between business premises and dwelling houses such that it may be inaccurate to
assume that fourth amendment guarantees extend equally to the two classes of loca-
tions. The Court in See seemed to indicate as much with its caveat as to application
of the Camara holding to business as opposed to private home settings.
35. See Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
375 (1974) (dealing with a New York statute authorizing searches limited to orders,
prescriptions or records relating to narcotic, depressant and stimulant drugs, which
other New York statutes require to be kept on the premises); Youghiogheny and Ohio
Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (allowing warrantless searches
of coal mines as required by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969);
United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg.Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972) (con-
cerning warrantless inspection by FDA inspectors which is valid because the business
involved is engaged in interstate commerce which is pervasively regulated by Congress
under the commerce clause).
36. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
37. Id. at 77.
38. The Colonnade court compared the inspection procedure which the Internal
Revenue Service uses to enforce excise taxes with the warrantless inspection laws
recognized as valid in Boyd governing excisable or dutiable articles and stolen goods.
397 U.S. at 76.
39. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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the Supreme Court reached a similar result by characterizing
the firearms industry as subject to close scrutiny under federal
regulation of interstate traffic. In the 1971 case of Wyman v.
James,40 the Court may have created another exception to the
warrant requirement in the area of state welfare programs. Al-
though the Court determined that the home visitation by a
social worker was not a search in the traditional criminal law
sense," it also concluded that even if the visit could be charac-
terized as a search, it would be reasonable under the fourth
amendment. Predictably, this conclusion was reached by bal-
ancing the governmental interest against the individual's right
to privacy. 2
The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 3 which applies
to any business that affects interstate commerce and has em-
ployees, also provides for warrantless administrative inspection
procedures. Section 657(a) of the Act authorizes inspections to
be conducted at reasonable times and without delay upon the
presentation of appropriate credentials." Regulations imple-
menting the inspection procedures provide that once a Compli-
40. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
41. Id. at 317.
42. Id. at 318. Some of the factors which the Court looked to in reaching its
conclusion included: 1) the particular public interest, 2) the function of the govern-
mental agency involved, 3) the use of public funds, 4) the emphasis of the authorizing
statute, 5) the need for the visit, 6) the means employed to effectuate the visit, 7) the
lack of complaint by the welfare beneficiary, 8) the type of person making the visit,
and 9) the lack of criminal sanctions. Id. at 318-24.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). The text of this section reads:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is author-
ized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, estab-
lishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work
is performed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other rea-
sonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any
such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines,
apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately
any such employer, owner, operator, agent or employee.
Note that according to the legislative history of the Act, a House amendment required
that an inspector's entry into a workplace be permitted "without delay," which was
not specified in the Senate bill, and resulted in the bill's present form. 1970 U.S. CODE
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ance Safety and Health Officer is refused entrance to the prem-
ises, the officer shall ascertain the reason for refusal and then
consult with the Area Director. The regulation provides for a
compulsory process by which entry may then be gained."
In the instant case, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,4" the Su-
preme Court held that the above-outlined OSHA inspection
procedure violates the fourth amendment." At issue was an
employer's refusal to allow an OSHA inspector to search the
premises of his electrical and plumbing installation business
without a warrant. The inspector presented his credentials and
explained that he wished to conduct a search of the working
area of the business because Barlow's, Inc. had been randomly
chosen in the agency's selection process. Mr. Barlow refused
permission and the Secretary of Labor subsequently petitioned
the United States District Court for the District of Idaho to
issue an order compelling Barlow to admit the inspector. Upon
issuance of this order, Barlow again refused admission and
sought and obtained injunctive relief against the warrantless
search. The Secretary appealed, challenging the judgment
granting the injunction.
The Court initially reaffirmed the principle that warrant-
less searches are generally unreasonable and that this rule ap-
plies to commercial premises as well as homes.4" The Court
then determined that the OSHA inspection does not fall within
any recognized exception; consequently, a warrant procedure is
a requisite to the statute's constitutional validity.49 Although
a warrant is necessary, probable cause in the criminal law sense
CoNG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5232-33. This wording implies that this was not originally
within the contemplation of the Act.
45. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1903, 1903.4 (1977).
46. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
47. For the lower courts' analyses of the OSHA inspection procedure, resulting
in the conclusion that such is unconstitutional, see Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall,
437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont. 1977); Usery v. Centrif-Air Machine Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp.
959 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Barlow's Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976); Dunlop
v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D. N.M. 1976); Brennan v. Gibson's
Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
48. 436 U.S. at 311-12.
49. Id. at 313-15. The Court distinguished closely regulated businesses subject




is not required. For the purposes of an administrative search,
probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be
based on a showing that reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards are satisfied with respect to the particular estab-
lishment, as well as on specific evidence of an existing viola-
tion. 0 The type of administrative warrant thus required would
provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is
reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute,
and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing neutral
criteria as to specific inspection decisions." Also, the warrant
would specify the scope and the objects of the search, thus
limiting the legal ambit of the inspection and advising the
employer of its limits. 52 Insofar as the Act purports to authorize
inspection without a warrant or its equivalent it is unconstitu-
tional .
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the
warrant clause has no application to routine, regulatory inspec-
tions of commercial premises, because such inspections are rea-
sonable under the fourth amendment.54 Furthermore, he
viewed the necessary warrant procedure as affording little pro-
tection to the employer, since probable cause to issue the war-
rant is satisfied by the showing of an inspection schedule."
The Barlow's warrant requirement, based upon a modified
probable cause,56 at first glance may appear to violate the
fourth amendment guarantees as originally understood. The
drafters feared the abuses inherent in a general warrant and
therefore sought to abate those offenses with a probable cause
prerequisite. Here, however, the warrant does not have the
disabilities of a general warrant: the warrant will list the spe-
cific criteria upon which it is based and will contain limitations
as to the extent of the inspection.57 Additionally, the inspection
50. Id. at 320-21.
51. Id. at 323.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 325.
54. Id. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehn-
quist).
55. Id. at 331-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. See text at note 50, supra.
57. The generality of the search referred not only to the scope of the area to be
searched but above all to the limitation on the occasions when the government may
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must be "reasonable" to provide a basis for probable cause to
justify the issuance of a warrant. It is in this respect, though,
that the warrant scheme authorized by the Barlow's court may
prove to be similar to the general warrants condemned by the
drafters. Although the writs of assistance were denounced be-
cause of their interference with individual interests in privacy,
they were also attacked from the standpoint of lacking a basis
of authority for their issuance.58 Under the Barlow's scheme the
probable cause, i.e., the reasonableness of a search, serves to
authorize the issuance of the warrant. If, as Justice Stevens
suggests, this probable cause exists where the contemplated
inspection is based upon a general administrative plan for the
enforcement of the Act,5' then, despite the existence of a basis
of authority for its issuance, the warrant becomes almost
meaningless in terms of protecting the individual's privacy
from governmental intrusion.'"
The adoption in Barlow's of the Camara reasonableness
tests" for business premises may afford some protection for the
right to privacy originally sought in the fourth amendment
guarantees. This standard of reasonableness would then serve
to adapt the original understanding of the fourth amendment
to modern needs." By equating probable cause with reasonable
legislative means or administrative standards for conducting
search. For a description of the evils of the general warrant which the authors had
foremost in mind, see Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. oF CHIC.
L. REV. 47, 50-51 (1974).
58. It was argued that writs of assistance could only validly be issued from the
English Court of Exchequer and not from any colonial courts. Furthermore, since
general warrants were no longer authorized by the common law, the writs were likewise
thought to be repugnant to the Magna Carta. N. LAssoN, supra note 2, at 59-61.
59. 439 U.S. at 331-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Compare Morris v. United States Dep't of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.
Ill. 1977) with In re Northwest Airlines, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1977), which
considered what is necessary to satisfy the probable cause required to issue a warrant.
The latter opinion requires that actual data be suppied to the magistrate while the
former simply looks to the existence of the Act itself to provide, through the balancing
of interests mandated in Camara and See, the probable cause to issue a warrant.
61. See text at note 32, supra.
62. For a discussion of_ the problems concomitant with modem urbanization
which conflict with individual rights, i.e., the necessity to vest in administrative offi-
cers broad powers of search and the submission of property rights in favor of increasing
regulation designed to vindicate the expanding social interests encompassed in the
present-day notions of public health, safety, morals, and welfare, see Schwartz, supra
note 34, at 419-20.
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an area inspection with respect to a particular dwelling, 3 the
Camara court recognized and reconciled individual rights and
administrative needs under a "reasonableness" banner.,
Barlow's adopts the same standard for business premises af-
fected by OSHA. Possibly the standard of modified probable
cause can be extended to all businesses affected by administra-
tive regulations, provided that such an extension does not fall
within any of the clearly defined exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Also, since probable cause may be based upon a
showing of reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an inspection as to a particular establishment,5
the reasonableness standard should sufficiently protect prem-
ises which are both private and commercial, a situation which
is possible under OSHA's broad standards of application.
The practical effects of the present decision on various
other regulatory statutes containing warrantless search provi-
sions can be measured by the language used by the Court in
expressing its own views toward the various regulations. The
Court stated, "In short, we base today's opinion on the facts
and law concerned with OSHA and do not retreat from a hold-
ing appropriate to that statute because of its real or imagined
effect on other, different administrative schemes." 6 Admit-
tedly, the Court did not limit its holding to OSHA, so that to
the extent possible, the applicability of the warrant require-
ment to other administrative inspection procedures must be
determined according to the guidance provided by the opinion.
Given that a warrantless search is unreasonable, the primary
determination is whether the inspection falls within an excep-
63. 387 U.S. at 538.
64. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973), in which
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, suggested a similar sort of accomodation to
realize modern needs yet still protect fourth amendment rights. He suggested that
under appropriate limiting circumstances there may exist a constitutionally adequate
equivalent of probable cause based on a number of relevant factors which serve to
determine the necessary standards. See also Note, 2 ALA. L. REv. 314 (1950), in which
the author suggests, "Granting the desirability of requiring health inspectors to obtain
warrants before entering private dwellings over the owners' objections, the solution of
the practical difficulties involved may lie in modifying certain provisions of search and
seizure law such as that concerned with the showing of probable cause in order to
permit the issuance of warrants for routine inspections." Id. at 320.
65. 436 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 321-22.
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tion to that general principle-if it does, no warrant is neces-
sary. However, if the inspection necessitates a warrant as a
prerequisite then the existence of probable cause must be es-
tablished. The factors listed in Camara provide a guide for
determining the reasonableness of an inspection for probable
cause purposes." The critical question, which the Court has left
unanswered, is how to determine in which category a particular
administrative inspection will fall: whether it will be included
in an exception to the warrant requirement or whether a war-
rant with modified probable cause will be required. By viewing
the value of the constitutionally protected interest as unchang-
ing,68 the key to determining the standard by which an inspec-
tion will be judged is the particular governmental interest in-
volved. Those areas traditionally subject to extensive gover-
mental inter regulation will fall within the exception and will
require no balancing."' Certain governmental interests will so
outweigh the individual interest that the result of the balanc-
ing process will be to create another exception to the warrant
requirement. 7' When the governmental interest is health-
related, the individual interest will prevail to the extent that a
warrant is required based upon something other than the crimi-
nal law equivalent of probable cause. Focusing upon the gov-
ernmental interest, then, the myriad of adminitrative inspec-
tion schemes can be appropriately placed within the Court's
fourth amendment analysis.7
67. See note 31, supra, and accompanying text.
68. Barlow's applies the Camara standard to commercial premises without the
caveat accompanying the See holding, so that the individual interest in privacy is the
same whether a private dwelling or a commercial premise is involved. See note 34,
supra.
69. Both Colonnade and Biswell characterize the governmental interest such
that if any balancing does occur, the outcome will inevitably favor the government as
opposed to the individual. The Boyd court also assumed the validity of certain govern-
mental interests.
70. Note the factors referred to in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See also
note 42, supra. The Barlow's court made reference to the existence of such excep-
tions with the following language: "The reasonableness of a warrantless search, how-
ever, will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each
statute. Some of the statutes cited apply only to a single industry, where regulations
might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant re-
quirement could apply." 436 U.S. at 321.
71. As evidenced by Camara, See, and Barlow's, the government's interest in
health will not so outweigh the individual interest in privacy as to negate the warrant
[Vol. 39
NOTES
Additionally left unanswered is the applicability of various
fourth amendment developments to the field of administrative
inspections. The use of a "modified" probable cause and the
express rejection of the criminal law meaning of probable cause
indicate a decision by the Court that a total incorporation of
criminal law probable cause concepts in the area of administra-
tive inspections would be inappropriate. The Court's differen-
tiation, however, does not eliminate the possibility of a limited
extension of criminal law doctrines to the area of administra-
tive inspections."
Granted that the court creates a new probable cause stan-
dard for administrative inspection warrant procedures, the
question then becomes whether two different probable cause
standards are permissible under the fourth amendment. Both
administrative and criminal inspections may result in a pen-
alty being imposed, whether that penalty be termed a "fine"
or a "punishment," 3 and both involve important governmental
requirement. Presumably, the same result would apply if an OSHA inspector sought
to investigate a liquor or firearms industry, since the governmental interest then be-.
comes one of health rather than that of enforcing a federal licensing program. Of
course, there may be administrative inspections in which the governmental interest is
varied and the result of any balancing will be determined by the particular government'
tal interest most emphasized by the court.
72. Cf. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa, 416 U.S. 861 (1974) (Su-
preme Court applied the "open fields" exception to the fourth amendment to health
inspections); Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 519 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975)
(plain view doctrine was applied to OSHA inspections); Accu-Namics, Inc. v. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 515 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1975) (the exclusion-
ary rule was rejected regarding OSHA inspections); and In re Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
437 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (the court rejected the criminal law requirements
of showing the reliability of the informant to establish probable cause for an OSHA
inspection).
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). Section 666 provides for civil penalties in the form
of fines (ranging from $1000 to $10,000) for violations of the Act. Additionally, the
section lists criminal punishments which result upon conviction of violations. Thus,'
the distinction between criminal and civil searches becomes less definite and less'
reasonable as the results of those searches become indistinguishable. Note also that'
assuming the two different standards of probable cause satisfy the fourth amendment
because of the civil-criminal distinction, the dichotomy becomes more tenuous as thie'
likelihood of criminal punishment increases. For example, given the validity of a
warrant issued under the required warrant procedure, the necessary authorization i
provided for the inspection of the business premises for unsafe working lconditions.
Query whether the inspection can validly proceed beyond those means necessary to
discover OSHA violations, possibly discovering criminal violations which will invoke




interests and individual rights to privacy. Furthermore, once
the initial determination has been made that a warrant is nec-
essary for the search to be reasonable, the language of the
fourth amendment does not support the probable cause dis-
tinction made by the Court. The result of the creation of a
modified probable cause may be a dilution of the criminal law
probable cause such that a criminal inspection that is reason-
able and statutorily authorized will provide an adequate basis
for the issuance of a warrant. Thus, the Court must be careful
to distinguish between the balancing process in the administra-
tive law area resulting in a modified probable cause and the
balancing in the criminal law area where probable cause is
judged by a different standard. Otherwise, a warrant require-
ment imposed to protect the individual's privacy would be-
come a means to circumvent the fourth amendment guaran-
tees.
The Barlow's warrant requirement, although based upon
a modified probable cause, is the least objectionable of avail-
able procedures constitutionally speaking. Although this hold-
ing does not eliminate the opportunity for abuse (a rubber-
stamp warrant),7" it is better than no warrant requirement at
all. The original concern for abuse of warrants is still recog-
nized in that statutory authority and specific limits as to the
areas to be searched are required for warrants to issue, yet
administrative concerns are not so hampered as to frustrate
legitimate governmental interests. The Supreme Court has
achieved a reconciliation between individual rights to privacy
and administrative needs. This present balance is based upon
a modern interpretation of the fourth amendment based upon
74. Justice Brennan in Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1959) stated:
It has been suggested that if the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a search
warrant is acknowledged to be applicable here [in health inspections], the
result will be a general watering-down of the standards for the issuance of search
warrants. For it is said that since it is agreed that a warrant for a health and
safety inspection can be made on a showing quite different in kind from that
which would, for example, justify a search for narcotics, magistrates will become
lax generally in issuing warrants. The suggested preventive for this laxity is a
drastic one: dispense with warrants for these inspections. We cannot believe




values sought to be protected by the drafters. Any lessening of
the present requirements will only serve to undermine fourth
amendment guarantees in the name of administrative effi-
ciency. At the least, the instant case should serve as a mini-
mum standard by which any further balancing is to be mea-
sured.
Rebecca L. Hudsmith
ABROGATION OF THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BAR IN CASES OF
DISPARATE RISKS
Justifications of the doctrine of contributory negligence'
rely upon various theories - causation, assumption of risk,
deterrence, apportionability of damages, and equity. Of all the
rationales articulated to justify the doctrine of contributory
negligence, the most fundamental is derived from public policy
-the law will not protect a person who does not protect him-
self.3 That is to say, the duty of care for others manifestly
should be no higher than the duty of self-protection.' Despite
the apparent soundness of this proposition, its result is some-
times a windfall of nonliability for a negligent defendant.5
1. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, a plaintiff is denied recovery
when his own unreasonable conduct, combined with that of the defendant, culminated
in the injury. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv. L. REv. 233, 233 (1908). The
doctrine was first articulated in Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809),
in which the plaintiff ran into a pole which the defendant had negligently laid across
the road. Had the plaintiff not been "riding violently," he could have avoided the
injury. The court refused to grant recovery saying: "One person being in fault will not
dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself." Id. at 927.
2. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.2 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAw
OF TORTS § 65 (1971); Bohlen, supra note 1, at 233; Lowndes, Contributory Negligence,
22 GEo. L.J. 674, 674-85 (1934).
3. Lowndes, supra note 2, at 681. The author describes this explanation as "the
archaic assumption of the individualism of the common'law, which required of every
tub that it stand upon its own bottom." Id.
4. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 254. "To hold otherwise would . . . rob of self-
reliance, and . . . enervate and emasculate [plaintiffs] . . . by removing from them
all responsibility for their own safety." Id. at 254-55.
5. Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. REv. 3, 4
(1927). Green comments that much can be said against the harshness of the contribu-
tory negligence bar, "because it throws the whole risk on the plaintiff, while it lets the
defendant, also a wrongdoer, go free." Id. at 5.
